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[L. A. No. 25583.

In Bank.

Jan. 19, 1960.]

MARIE WEBER, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF
LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; PAUL D.
WEBER, Real Party in Interest.

-)

[1] Divorce-Foreign Divorce-Effect on Right to Alimony.-An
ex parte foreign divorce decree, even if valid, cannot deprive
a California court of jurisdiction to enforce support rights
held under the laws of California at the time of divorce.
[2] Id.-Foreign Divorce-Effect on Right to Alimony.-Since a
wife may maintain her action for permanent alimony without
attacking her husband's ex parte divorce decree obtained in
another state, she may receive temporary alimony, costs and
fees to enable her to continue the suit when she has shown
that she needs such relief and that the husband has the ability
to provide such assistance.

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 312 et seq.;
Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 972 et seq.
McX. Dig. References: [1-3] Divorce, § 304; [4] Mandamus, § 36.
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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[8] Id. - Foreign Divorce - Eifect on Right to Alimony. - Where
the divorce court of a sister state in granting the husband an
ex parte divorce decree has no jurisdiction to terminate the
wife's right to support under California law, it is immaterial
whether the wife's action for divorce and permanent alimony
was filed before or after the divorce decree of the sister state
became final; in either case the sister state has no jurisdiction.
[4] Mandamus-To Courts.-A writ of mandate may properly be
used to compel the superior court to exercise its jurisdiction
though its refusal to do so is based on the considered but erroneous belief that it has no jurisdiction as a matter of law to
grant the relief requested, if no other adequate remedy exists.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1086.)

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County to hear and determine an order to
show cause why petitioner should not receive temporary alimony, costs and fees in her divorce action. Writ granted.
Newell & Chester, Robert M. Newell and Theodore A.
Chester for Petitioner.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, William E. Lamoreaux, Assistant County Counsel, Edward A. Nugent and
David Bernard, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.
Joslyn & Joslyn, J. M. Joslyn and R. B. Joslyn for Real
Party in Interest.
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate compelling respondent superior court to hear and determine on the
merits an order to show cause why she should not receive temporary alimony, costs, and fees in her action for divorce
against the real party in interest.
Petitioner (hereinafter referred to as plaintiff) and the
real party in interest (hereinafter referred to as defendant)
were married in Los Angeles on October 4, 1940, and resided
there until early in 1950. At that time they moved to Morocco,
North Africa, where defendant was employed by the United
States Corps of Engineers. About 1952 at defendant's request
plaintiff returned to their home in Los Angeles. Thereafter
defendant unsuccessfully attempted to procure a divorce from
plaintiff in the Consular Court of the United States in Morocco.
In 1956 he returned to the United States and took up residence
in Reno, Nevada. He filed an action for divorce against plain-

)

Jan. 1960]

-)

-

.

)

WEBER 11. SUPERIOR COURT
(53 C.2d f03; 2 CaJ.Rptr. 9, 348 P.2d 572)

405

tiff in that state, serving her by publication. The Nevada court
granted an ex parte divorce to defendant on August 16, 1956.
Defendant then proceeded to Los Angeles, where he married
his present wife and where they now reside.
Plaintiff filed her action for divorce and permanent alimony
in respondent court on March 17, 1959. She obtained an order
to show cause why she should not be awarded temporary alimony, costs, and fees. At the hearing on this order, defendant
objected to the introduction of any evidence as to plaintiff's
need for the award or his ability to pay it on the ground that
his ex parte divorce constituted a complete defense to plaintiff's motion. Respondent court sustained defendant's objection and entered its minute order as follows:
"For the purpose of this hearing, there is found to be a
valid decree of divorce between the parties and there is no
present marriage between the parties hereto. The Court is
without jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed for."
[1] Hudson v. Hudson, 52 Ca1.2d 735, 745 [344 P.2d
295], establishes that an ex parte divorce decree, even if valid,
cannot deprive a California court of jurisdiction to enforce
support rights held under the laws of California at the time
of the divorce. Defendant contends, however, that even if
respondent court has jurisdiction under the Hudson case to
award plaintiff permanent alimony, its jurisdiction to award
her temporary alimony and attorney's fees nevertheless depends on an existing marriage under Civil Code, sections 137.2
and 137.3. This contention was raised and expressly answered
adversely to defendant in the Hudson case. (Hudson v. Hudson, supra, at 744-745.) [2] Our conclusion in that case
that" [s]ince plaintiff may maintain her action for permanent
alimony without attacking defendant's Idaho decree, it follows
that she may receive temporary alimony, costs, and fees to
enable her to continue the suit when she has shown that she
needs such relief and that defendant has the ability to provide
such assistance" (Hudson v. Hudson, sttpra, at (745) also
governs here.
[3] Defendant contends, however, that this case is distinguishable from the Hudson case because plaintiff filed her
action for divorce and permanent alimony nearly three years
after defendant's Nevada decree became final. In the Hudson
case, the wife filed her action for divorce approximatel~' one
month before her husband filed his ex parte action in Idaho.
Defendant urges that, although the husband'8 divorce decree
became final prior to the hearing on the order to show cause
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in Hudson, the California court had nevertheless already acquired jurisdiction of the wife's action and was thereby empowered to award relief to her. The Hudson decision, however,
was not based on the fact that the California court first acquired jurisdiction but on the ground that the Idaho court had
no jurisdiction to terminate the wife's right to support. Similarly, the Nevada court had no such jurisdiction here. (Hudson
v. Hudson, supra, at 741-745.)
[ 4] The writ of mandate may properly be used to compel
respondent court to exercise its jurisdiction even though its
refusal to do so is "based on the considered but erroneous
belief that it has no jurisdiction as a matter of law to grant the
relief requested" (Robinson v. Superior Oourt, 35 Ca1.2d 379,
383-387 [218 P.2d 10]), if no other adequate remedy exists
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1086). Since no purpose but delay
would be served at this time by reviewing the District Court
of Appeal's decision when it issued the alternative writ that
the remedy by appeal was inadequate, we accept it for the purpose of this proceeding. (Atkinson v. Superior 001trt, 49
Ca1.2d 338, 342 [316 P.2d 960] ; Bowles v. Superior Oourt, 44
Ca1.2d 574, 582 [283 P.2d 704] ; cf. Oity of Los Angeles v.
Superior Oourt, 51 Ca1.2d 423,429 [333 P.2d 745].)
Let the peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., McComb, J., Peters, J.,
and Tobriner, J., pro tem.,· concurred•
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